SWC75
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PART 2
A DEAD MARKET AND A LIVE BALL
Having lost their interpretation of the reserve clause to arbitration and failed to break the union with a strike, the owners resorted to an old strategy, a “gentleman’s agreement” not to fully utilize the talent pool by not offering contracts to a certain group of players. In the old days, that was black players: now it was free agents. The legal term for this is collusion.
One of Marvin Miller’s first negotiations with the owners back in 1968 came in the wake of the combined hold out of Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale. The owners didn’t want players to form “package deals” like that. Miller agreed, providing the owners didn’t do it either. He got the following language written into the collective bargaining agreement: "Players shall not act in concert with other players and clubs shall not act in concert with other clubs." (Wikipedia).
In the 1984 owner’s meetings, the owners agreed among themselves to limit contracts to 3 years for positon players and 2 years for pitchers. It’s OK for a club to decide to do that on their own but all the teams or multiple teams couldn’t do that under the CBA.
That wasn’t immediately noticeable but what happened the next year was. There were 35 free agents in the market and four of them were offered contracts. All four of those were no longer wanted by their old teams. The Union filed a grievance. That went to an arbitrator- two years later- who ruled that the CBA had been violated. By that time two more groups of free agents had found themselves unwanted and two more grievances had been filed. Most signed with their old clubs- for one year contracts so they could try it again. For the first time since Ed Seitz’s 1976 ruling on the reserve clause, the average major league salary declined and the salaries of the free agents declined by 15%.
The punishment devised by the arbitrator in the first case was a flat penalty payment of $10.5 million to be distributed by the union and a “second chance” to be free agents for seven players who ahd signed multi-year contracts. Only 14 of the original 35 free agents were still in baseball when this was announced in January, 1988. The second grievance, (the one for 1986), was decided in October, 1989 had the same result, except the penalty was now $38 million. The third grievance, based on 1987, produced damages of $64.5 million. Finally the three cases were combined on appeal and produced an agreement in November 1990 for the owners to pay a total of $280 million. Would that be enough to get the owners to stop?
Commissioner Fay Vincent called a halt to it, telling the owners: “The single biggest reality you guys have to face up to is collusion. You stole $280 million from the players, and the players are unified to a man around that issue, because you got caught and many of you are still involved.” He alter blamed the 1994-5 strike on “player anger at what he called the owners' theft from the players”. He also claimed that the 1993 and 1998 expansions were designed to get the owners money to pay the penalty from the expansion fees they charged the new owners , (again Wikipedia).
Even this didn’t stop the collusion. The union got another settlement of $12 million after a 2002 allegation and field grievances on behalf of t Alex Rodriguez in 2007 and Barry Bonds in 2008. The union announced “concerns” about collusion in 2010. Of course, one man’s prudence is another man’s collusion. It’s likely to be an ongoing issue.
Marvin Miller considered this to be a worse scandal than the Black Sox, because it involved all the clubs and was an agreement not “to improve your team”, which “fixed the pennant race”:
In 1987, some remarkable things began happening. Balls were flying out of ball parks. I remember seeing a ballgame on TV where a player hit a home run when his bat shattered. Don Mattingly hit home runs in 8 consecutive games. Players were hitting more home runs than they ever had before. George Bell, who had never hit more than 31 homers in a season, hit 47. He would never hit more than 25 again. Wade Boggs hit 24 home runs. His only other season in double figures was 11 seven years later. Dale Sveum hit 25 homers. His only year in double figures was 12 ten years later. Jack Clark hit a career high 35 home runs despite missing 31 games. Will Clark also hit 35 and never hit 30 in any other year. Eric Davis also had a career high with 37, despite missing 33 games. Andre Dawson won the MVP with 49 home runs. He never had more than 32 in any other year. Brook Jacoby, who had never hit more than 20 homers, hit 32 - and then 9 the next year. Howard Johnson went from a career high of 12 to 36. Wally Joyner went from 22 to 34. He never hit more than 21 again. A rookie named Mark McGwire set a record with 49 home runs, a figure it took him 9 years to top. Lloyd Mosby, a center fielder known for his speed, hit 26 homers – and 10 the next year. Devon White, a center fielder noted for his speed, hit 24 homers- and 11 the next year. Dale Murphy went from 29 to 44 and then back to 24 in 1988. Rookie Matt Nokes impressed with 32 homers- then hit 16 the next year. For Mike Pagliarulo it was 32 to 15. For Larry Parrish, it was 32 to 14. Juan Samuel hit 28 ho0mers and everybody, including the Mets, thought he was a slugger. He never hit more than 13 again. Larry Sheets had never hit more than 18, then hit 31, then hit 10 in ’88. Cory Snyder hit 33, then 26 then 18, then 14, then 3. Alan trammel had a career high 28 homers - and never had more than 15 again. So did Andy Van Slyke with 25- and then never more than 17. Ozzie Virgil hit 27 homers- and 10 in the rest of his career. Tim Wallach hit .298 with 26 home runs and 123 RBI- all career highs – in 1987 and then hit .257-12-69 in 1988. Darryl Strawberry was consistent: he hit 39 homers in 1987 and 39 homers in 1988. He was 10 behind Andre Dawson for the 1987 home run crown and won the 1988 home run crown with the same number.
Overall, major league homers went from 3,813 in 1986 to 4,458 in 1987 to 3,180 in 1988. 60 players hit 20+ home runs in 1986 and 13 hit 30+. In 1987, 79 players hit 20+ and 20 hit 30+. In 1988, 45 hit 20+ and 5 hit 30+.
During the season, the difference was noticed immediately. Bobby Bonds took batting practice and said
"I've taken batting practice and I've hit those balls... I've hit the ball as far as I did when I was 25 years old. I'm not that strong. I hit balls really terrible and they go over the fence. When I was playing, I'd hit balls and say, 'Oh my God,' and it didn't go out. Now I hit balls and I say, 'Oh my God,' and they clear the fence by 30 feet.” Sparky Anderson: "Can you imagine the Big Red Machine with that nitroglycerin ball? … Souped? These balls just fly." Jack Morris: "Yes, I think the balls are different." Mike Scott: "I really think that the balls are going farther." Jay Howell joked, "I think it might be something in the trees, maybe it's acid rain causing a hardening of the wood." Bert Blyleven suspected a rabbit ball too. "There's a whole family in there." Garth Iorg, after hitting two home runs: "I'd been hearing about it, but I felt left out. Now I've finally gotten in on the jackrabbit ball." Pitching coach Herm Starette: "The ball is juiced." And Pete Rose: "I definitely think there's a livelier ball." (SB Nation).
Other theories came out of the woodwork:
- Random statistical fluctuation.
- Aluminum bats used in high school and college, which either connived pitchers not to throw fastballs or not throw inside.
- Rushing pitchers to the big leagues.
- Ray Miller offered off-season training and "top-notch athletes" leaving the pitching ranks as other excuses. "Ten years ago, the great athletes were pitchers," Miller said. "Jack Morris, Tom Seaver, Steve Carlton, Jim Palmer -- guys like that. Now the top-notch athletes aren't pitchers. The quality athletes go into other sports or they become hitters."
- Lively bats. Ozzie Virgil, who would hit a career-best 27 home runs in 1987, talked about his more balanced bat. "It's not bottom-heavy the way it was and I'm able to get on top of the pitch a little bit more."
- Corked bats, especially when Billy Hatcher broke his and it was found to be full of the stuff.
- The Umps were calling a smaller strike zone because they stopped using external chest protectors and could see the pitches better.
- Expansion, although 1987 was not an expansion year.
- The weather.
- Steroids were not mentioned at the time but we now know players were already taking them.
- The retropark era had not begun so nobody talked about ballparks, as they would in the 90’s.
What is needed to explain 1987 is an explanation that describes how home run hitting could so sharply increase in one year and then deflate at an even greater rate the next year. It can’t be explained by long-term trends or cheating by the players: why would they suddenly stop? It’s not about new ballparks or expansion. Is it the weather? It’s unlikely the weather would change that markedly or make that much difference. The most likely explanation is that something was different about the ball. MLB insisted there was no difference and offered tests to prove it. But people were not convinced that those tests were conclusive:
Down the Rabbit Hole: Maybe MLB Knows Why Balls Are Hopping Off Bats
Changes in home run rates during the Retrosheet years
http://deadspin.com/5937432/was-mlbs-juiced-era-actually-a-juiced-ball-era
I remember at the time, reading an article, (which I cannot find now), alleging that the author had talked to someone, then retired, who had worked for decades in the ball manufacture industry and who told him that they had periodically been asked to tighten or loosen the laces on the ball. He said they’d tighten the laces a little each year, which would make it more resilient and thus travel farther when hit, then suddenly loosen them. The author of the article speculated that the idea was to put fannies in the seats by gradually increasing offense each year, making the batters more productive and thus more impressive and putting them in a positon to threaten records, then, when the batters began demanding more money due to their increased productivity, the laces would suddenly be loosened. Suddenly those home runs would become fly-outs and both home runs and batting averages would decrease. The owners could then say no to the player demands or even lower salaries and save money. Then the process would start all over again. The writer said he had examined baseball numbers over the years and concluded that there were 7-8 year cycles of increased offense followed by a precipitous decline in one year, then the beginning of a new cycle. He concluded that 1987 was the end of such a cycle, one which began with the 1981 strike and was enhanced due to the need to try to recover the game’s popularity after that strike, but that it was still part of a decades long trend.
When I look at hitting trends in baseball, I don’t look at home runs because the desire to hit home runs has changed over the years. In the dead ball era, people didn’t try for home runs because it was hard to hit the ball that far. The game was viewed as a cat and mouse game between the batter and the fielders and trying to bludgeon the ball over the fielder’s heads was considered crude and inefficient. Then Babe Ruth came along and he not lonely liked to hit the ball over everybody’s head but he could do with a consistency that had never been seen. Aided by the fact that the owners were urged to replace soiled balls during games in the wake of the influenza epidemic, which meant that the Babe was hitting ‘new’ balls each time up, Ruth transformed the game. But it was a gradual transformation. The immediate impact of the ‘new’ balls was an increase in batting averages because players were still playing the same game they had always played: hit the ball between fielders and run the bases aggressively. Ruth’s popularity caused baseball owners to look for their own version of Ruth and Gehrig caused them to look for a second one. Eventually every team had at least one home run hitter in middle of their order. But they guys in front of them were told to get on base and stay there until the big hit and the guys behind them were in there for their defense. In the TV era, the home run was the route to glory, glory being defined as getting in the highlight reel and more and more players tried to hit home runs, especially when the steroid/juiced ball era began. So overall home run rates have been a product of desire as well as capability. It’s not as if all players have always been trying to hit home runs and the live ball era allowed them to do it.
But players have always been trying to hit the ball hard. It gets between the fielders faster that way. So if you look at all kinds of hits, singles, doubles, triples and home runs, you get a better picture of the liveliness of the ball. That’s what slugging percentage does and here are the major league slugging percentages since the beginning of the “live ball era”, (really the “new ball era”) in 1920:
1920’s
1920 .373 1921 .404 1922 .402 1923 .392 1924 .395 1925 .412
1926 .389 1927 .394 1928 .397 1929 .417 Average: .398
1930’s
1930 .435 1931 .392 1932 .401 1933 .377 1934 .398 1935 .397
1936 .405 1937 .399 1938 .396 1939 .397 Average: .400
1940’s
1940 .392 1941 .376 1942 .351 1943 .345 1944 .359 1945 .355
1946 .361 1947 .378 1948 .383 1949 .385 Average: .369
1950’s
1950 .403 1951 .386 1952 .370 1953 .398 1954 .391 1955 .395
1956 .398 1957 .392 1958 .395 1959: .393 Average: .392
1960’s
1960 .388 1961 .401 1962 .394 1963 .372 1964 .379 1965 .373
1966 .377 1967 .358 1968 .341 1969 .370 Average: .375
1970’s
1970 .386 1971 .366 1972 .355 1973 .379 1974 .370 1975 .375
1976 .362 1977 .402 1978 .379 1979 .397 Average: .377
1980’s
1980 .388 1981 .369 1982 .388 1983 .389 1984 .384 1985 .390
1986 .394 1987 .415 1988 .377 1989 .375 Average: .387
1990’s
1990 .386 1991 .384 1992 .378 1993 .404 1994 .425 1995 .418
1996 .427 1997 .420 1998 .422 1999 .435 Average: .410
2000’s
2000 .438 2001 .427 2002 .417 2003 .423 2004 .428 2005 .419
2006 .422 2007 .423 2008 .417 2009 .419 Average: .423
2010’s
2010: .403 2011: .400 2012:: .406 2013: .402 2014: .387 2015: .405
I don’t see any pattern there in the ball getting livelier for a number of years in a row and then suddenly dropping. There was an increase from 1984-87 and then a big drop. It may be that the owners decided to gradually juice the ball in those four years and then loosen the laces. It would make more sense to have a 4-5 offensive run rather than wait 7-8 years to “correct” things. You sign a lot of contracts in 7-8 years and you wouldn’t want to be stuck with them when the players stopped producing. It may have been just an isolated example of the owners trying to get the fans back after the ’81 strike by spiking the offensive numbers and then normalizing things once attendance was up.
It’s interesting that in this decade, slugging has gone down compared to the 1994-2009 era but it hasn’t gone down to the pre-1994 levels. That could reflect a reduction in steroid use but not a reduction in resiliency of the ball. They do show that 1987 belongs with the 1994-2009 era. Whatever happened then may well have been what happened in the next decade, a hint of things to come.
A DEAD MARKET AND A LIVE BALL
Having lost their interpretation of the reserve clause to arbitration and failed to break the union with a strike, the owners resorted to an old strategy, a “gentleman’s agreement” not to fully utilize the talent pool by not offering contracts to a certain group of players. In the old days, that was black players: now it was free agents. The legal term for this is collusion.
One of Marvin Miller’s first negotiations with the owners back in 1968 came in the wake of the combined hold out of Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale. The owners didn’t want players to form “package deals” like that. Miller agreed, providing the owners didn’t do it either. He got the following language written into the collective bargaining agreement: "Players shall not act in concert with other players and clubs shall not act in concert with other clubs." (Wikipedia).
In the 1984 owner’s meetings, the owners agreed among themselves to limit contracts to 3 years for positon players and 2 years for pitchers. It’s OK for a club to decide to do that on their own but all the teams or multiple teams couldn’t do that under the CBA.
That wasn’t immediately noticeable but what happened the next year was. There were 35 free agents in the market and four of them were offered contracts. All four of those were no longer wanted by their old teams. The Union filed a grievance. That went to an arbitrator- two years later- who ruled that the CBA had been violated. By that time two more groups of free agents had found themselves unwanted and two more grievances had been filed. Most signed with their old clubs- for one year contracts so they could try it again. For the first time since Ed Seitz’s 1976 ruling on the reserve clause, the average major league salary declined and the salaries of the free agents declined by 15%.
The punishment devised by the arbitrator in the first case was a flat penalty payment of $10.5 million to be distributed by the union and a “second chance” to be free agents for seven players who ahd signed multi-year contracts. Only 14 of the original 35 free agents were still in baseball when this was announced in January, 1988. The second grievance, (the one for 1986), was decided in October, 1989 had the same result, except the penalty was now $38 million. The third grievance, based on 1987, produced damages of $64.5 million. Finally the three cases were combined on appeal and produced an agreement in November 1990 for the owners to pay a total of $280 million. Would that be enough to get the owners to stop?
Commissioner Fay Vincent called a halt to it, telling the owners: “The single biggest reality you guys have to face up to is collusion. You stole $280 million from the players, and the players are unified to a man around that issue, because you got caught and many of you are still involved.” He alter blamed the 1994-5 strike on “player anger at what he called the owners' theft from the players”. He also claimed that the 1993 and 1998 expansions were designed to get the owners money to pay the penalty from the expansion fees they charged the new owners , (again Wikipedia).
Even this didn’t stop the collusion. The union got another settlement of $12 million after a 2002 allegation and field grievances on behalf of t Alex Rodriguez in 2007 and Barry Bonds in 2008. The union announced “concerns” about collusion in 2010. Of course, one man’s prudence is another man’s collusion. It’s likely to be an ongoing issue.
Marvin Miller considered this to be a worse scandal than the Black Sox, because it involved all the clubs and was an agreement not “to improve your team”, which “fixed the pennant race”:
In 1987, some remarkable things began happening. Balls were flying out of ball parks. I remember seeing a ballgame on TV where a player hit a home run when his bat shattered. Don Mattingly hit home runs in 8 consecutive games. Players were hitting more home runs than they ever had before. George Bell, who had never hit more than 31 homers in a season, hit 47. He would never hit more than 25 again. Wade Boggs hit 24 home runs. His only other season in double figures was 11 seven years later. Dale Sveum hit 25 homers. His only year in double figures was 12 ten years later. Jack Clark hit a career high 35 home runs despite missing 31 games. Will Clark also hit 35 and never hit 30 in any other year. Eric Davis also had a career high with 37, despite missing 33 games. Andre Dawson won the MVP with 49 home runs. He never had more than 32 in any other year. Brook Jacoby, who had never hit more than 20 homers, hit 32 - and then 9 the next year. Howard Johnson went from a career high of 12 to 36. Wally Joyner went from 22 to 34. He never hit more than 21 again. A rookie named Mark McGwire set a record with 49 home runs, a figure it took him 9 years to top. Lloyd Mosby, a center fielder known for his speed, hit 26 homers – and 10 the next year. Devon White, a center fielder noted for his speed, hit 24 homers- and 11 the next year. Dale Murphy went from 29 to 44 and then back to 24 in 1988. Rookie Matt Nokes impressed with 32 homers- then hit 16 the next year. For Mike Pagliarulo it was 32 to 15. For Larry Parrish, it was 32 to 14. Juan Samuel hit 28 ho0mers and everybody, including the Mets, thought he was a slugger. He never hit more than 13 again. Larry Sheets had never hit more than 18, then hit 31, then hit 10 in ’88. Cory Snyder hit 33, then 26 then 18, then 14, then 3. Alan trammel had a career high 28 homers - and never had more than 15 again. So did Andy Van Slyke with 25- and then never more than 17. Ozzie Virgil hit 27 homers- and 10 in the rest of his career. Tim Wallach hit .298 with 26 home runs and 123 RBI- all career highs – in 1987 and then hit .257-12-69 in 1988. Darryl Strawberry was consistent: he hit 39 homers in 1987 and 39 homers in 1988. He was 10 behind Andre Dawson for the 1987 home run crown and won the 1988 home run crown with the same number.
Overall, major league homers went from 3,813 in 1986 to 4,458 in 1987 to 3,180 in 1988. 60 players hit 20+ home runs in 1986 and 13 hit 30+. In 1987, 79 players hit 20+ and 20 hit 30+. In 1988, 45 hit 20+ and 5 hit 30+.
During the season, the difference was noticed immediately. Bobby Bonds took batting practice and said
"I've taken batting practice and I've hit those balls... I've hit the ball as far as I did when I was 25 years old. I'm not that strong. I hit balls really terrible and they go over the fence. When I was playing, I'd hit balls and say, 'Oh my God,' and it didn't go out. Now I hit balls and I say, 'Oh my God,' and they clear the fence by 30 feet.” Sparky Anderson: "Can you imagine the Big Red Machine with that nitroglycerin ball? … Souped? These balls just fly." Jack Morris: "Yes, I think the balls are different." Mike Scott: "I really think that the balls are going farther." Jay Howell joked, "I think it might be something in the trees, maybe it's acid rain causing a hardening of the wood." Bert Blyleven suspected a rabbit ball too. "There's a whole family in there." Garth Iorg, after hitting two home runs: "I'd been hearing about it, but I felt left out. Now I've finally gotten in on the jackrabbit ball." Pitching coach Herm Starette: "The ball is juiced." And Pete Rose: "I definitely think there's a livelier ball." (SB Nation).
Other theories came out of the woodwork:
- Random statistical fluctuation.
- Aluminum bats used in high school and college, which either connived pitchers not to throw fastballs or not throw inside.
- Rushing pitchers to the big leagues.
- Ray Miller offered off-season training and "top-notch athletes" leaving the pitching ranks as other excuses. "Ten years ago, the great athletes were pitchers," Miller said. "Jack Morris, Tom Seaver, Steve Carlton, Jim Palmer -- guys like that. Now the top-notch athletes aren't pitchers. The quality athletes go into other sports or they become hitters."
- Lively bats. Ozzie Virgil, who would hit a career-best 27 home runs in 1987, talked about his more balanced bat. "It's not bottom-heavy the way it was and I'm able to get on top of the pitch a little bit more."
- Corked bats, especially when Billy Hatcher broke his and it was found to be full of the stuff.
- The Umps were calling a smaller strike zone because they stopped using external chest protectors and could see the pitches better.
- Expansion, although 1987 was not an expansion year.
- The weather.
- Steroids were not mentioned at the time but we now know players were already taking them.
- The retropark era had not begun so nobody talked about ballparks, as they would in the 90’s.
What is needed to explain 1987 is an explanation that describes how home run hitting could so sharply increase in one year and then deflate at an even greater rate the next year. It can’t be explained by long-term trends or cheating by the players: why would they suddenly stop? It’s not about new ballparks or expansion. Is it the weather? It’s unlikely the weather would change that markedly or make that much difference. The most likely explanation is that something was different about the ball. MLB insisted there was no difference and offered tests to prove it. But people were not convinced that those tests were conclusive:
Down the Rabbit Hole: Maybe MLB Knows Why Balls Are Hopping Off Bats
Changes in home run rates during the Retrosheet years
http://deadspin.com/5937432/was-mlbs-juiced-era-actually-a-juiced-ball-era
I remember at the time, reading an article, (which I cannot find now), alleging that the author had talked to someone, then retired, who had worked for decades in the ball manufacture industry and who told him that they had periodically been asked to tighten or loosen the laces on the ball. He said they’d tighten the laces a little each year, which would make it more resilient and thus travel farther when hit, then suddenly loosen them. The author of the article speculated that the idea was to put fannies in the seats by gradually increasing offense each year, making the batters more productive and thus more impressive and putting them in a positon to threaten records, then, when the batters began demanding more money due to their increased productivity, the laces would suddenly be loosened. Suddenly those home runs would become fly-outs and both home runs and batting averages would decrease. The owners could then say no to the player demands or even lower salaries and save money. Then the process would start all over again. The writer said he had examined baseball numbers over the years and concluded that there were 7-8 year cycles of increased offense followed by a precipitous decline in one year, then the beginning of a new cycle. He concluded that 1987 was the end of such a cycle, one which began with the 1981 strike and was enhanced due to the need to try to recover the game’s popularity after that strike, but that it was still part of a decades long trend.
When I look at hitting trends in baseball, I don’t look at home runs because the desire to hit home runs has changed over the years. In the dead ball era, people didn’t try for home runs because it was hard to hit the ball that far. The game was viewed as a cat and mouse game between the batter and the fielders and trying to bludgeon the ball over the fielder’s heads was considered crude and inefficient. Then Babe Ruth came along and he not lonely liked to hit the ball over everybody’s head but he could do with a consistency that had never been seen. Aided by the fact that the owners were urged to replace soiled balls during games in the wake of the influenza epidemic, which meant that the Babe was hitting ‘new’ balls each time up, Ruth transformed the game. But it was a gradual transformation. The immediate impact of the ‘new’ balls was an increase in batting averages because players were still playing the same game they had always played: hit the ball between fielders and run the bases aggressively. Ruth’s popularity caused baseball owners to look for their own version of Ruth and Gehrig caused them to look for a second one. Eventually every team had at least one home run hitter in middle of their order. But they guys in front of them were told to get on base and stay there until the big hit and the guys behind them were in there for their defense. In the TV era, the home run was the route to glory, glory being defined as getting in the highlight reel and more and more players tried to hit home runs, especially when the steroid/juiced ball era began. So overall home run rates have been a product of desire as well as capability. It’s not as if all players have always been trying to hit home runs and the live ball era allowed them to do it.
But players have always been trying to hit the ball hard. It gets between the fielders faster that way. So if you look at all kinds of hits, singles, doubles, triples and home runs, you get a better picture of the liveliness of the ball. That’s what slugging percentage does and here are the major league slugging percentages since the beginning of the “live ball era”, (really the “new ball era”) in 1920:
1920’s
1920 .373 1921 .404 1922 .402 1923 .392 1924 .395 1925 .412
1926 .389 1927 .394 1928 .397 1929 .417 Average: .398
1930’s
1930 .435 1931 .392 1932 .401 1933 .377 1934 .398 1935 .397
1936 .405 1937 .399 1938 .396 1939 .397 Average: .400
1940’s
1940 .392 1941 .376 1942 .351 1943 .345 1944 .359 1945 .355
1946 .361 1947 .378 1948 .383 1949 .385 Average: .369
1950’s
1950 .403 1951 .386 1952 .370 1953 .398 1954 .391 1955 .395
1956 .398 1957 .392 1958 .395 1959: .393 Average: .392
1960’s
1960 .388 1961 .401 1962 .394 1963 .372 1964 .379 1965 .373
1966 .377 1967 .358 1968 .341 1969 .370 Average: .375
1970’s
1970 .386 1971 .366 1972 .355 1973 .379 1974 .370 1975 .375
1976 .362 1977 .402 1978 .379 1979 .397 Average: .377
1980’s
1980 .388 1981 .369 1982 .388 1983 .389 1984 .384 1985 .390
1986 .394 1987 .415 1988 .377 1989 .375 Average: .387
1990’s
1990 .386 1991 .384 1992 .378 1993 .404 1994 .425 1995 .418
1996 .427 1997 .420 1998 .422 1999 .435 Average: .410
2000’s
2000 .438 2001 .427 2002 .417 2003 .423 2004 .428 2005 .419
2006 .422 2007 .423 2008 .417 2009 .419 Average: .423
2010’s
2010: .403 2011: .400 2012:: .406 2013: .402 2014: .387 2015: .405
I don’t see any pattern there in the ball getting livelier for a number of years in a row and then suddenly dropping. There was an increase from 1984-87 and then a big drop. It may be that the owners decided to gradually juice the ball in those four years and then loosen the laces. It would make more sense to have a 4-5 offensive run rather than wait 7-8 years to “correct” things. You sign a lot of contracts in 7-8 years and you wouldn’t want to be stuck with them when the players stopped producing. It may have been just an isolated example of the owners trying to get the fans back after the ’81 strike by spiking the offensive numbers and then normalizing things once attendance was up.
It’s interesting that in this decade, slugging has gone down compared to the 1994-2009 era but it hasn’t gone down to the pre-1994 levels. That could reflect a reduction in steroid use but not a reduction in resiliency of the ball. They do show that 1987 belongs with the 1994-2009 era. Whatever happened then may well have been what happened in the next decade, a hint of things to come.