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Message: [QUOTE="SWC75, post: 1810898, member: 289"] [I]A Sea Change[/I] In 1994 came the explosion and it produced a tidal wave of hitting. . In the 123 years since the National Association began playing in 1871, (74 of those years in the “live ball” era), 11 batters had hit 50 or more home runs a total of 18 times: Babe Ruth did it four times: 54 in 1920, 59 in 1921, 60 in 1927 and 54 in 1928. Hack Wilson hit 56 in 1930, the year the entire National League hit .303. Jimmie Foxx did it twice: 58 in 1932 and 50 in 1958, when Hank Greenberg hit 58 home runs. Johnny Mize and Ralph Kiner hit 51 home runs in 1947 and Kiner hit 54 two years later in 1949. Willie Mays hit 51 in 1955 and Mickey Mantle 52 the next year, 1956. In 1961, for the only time in history two teammates topped the 50 mark: Mantle with 54 and Roger Maris with 61. Mays hit 52 in 1952. George Foster matched that a dozen years later in 1977. Cecil Fielder hit 51 in 1990. After Mantle and Maris in 1961, people thought that with the expansion era, the home run record was going to be broken repeatedly – and undeservedly. Commissioner Ford Frick, who co-wrote the Babe’s biography ordered that the mound be raised and the strike zone increased, thus creating the pitcher-dominated era of the 1960’s. That and the new ballparks, which tended to favor pitchers due to their regular dimensions, the record was actually less threatened than it had been in the previous era. Roger Maris’ record lasted longer than Babe Ruth’s. After 15 fifty home run years in 42 seasons, there were only 3 in the next thirty-three years. I remember that, entering the 90’s, there was concern that power hitting was declining. 1989 had been the first year of the live ball era when nobody in minor league baseball hit 30 home runs. Where were the young power hitters? There was nothing to worry about. From the beginning of the 1994 season, it was obvious that something was up. People were hitting home runs like they were going out of style. As of August 12, 1994, Matt Williams of the Giants was hitting .267 but with 43 home runs and 96 RBIs in 112 games. More impressive was Houston’s Jeff Bagwell, who was batting an astronomical .368 with 39 homers and 116 RBIs. (Even Bagwell wasn’t close to leading the league in batting average: Tony Gwynn was hitting .394.) Barry Bonds was .312-37-81. Fred McGriff was .318-34-94. Andres Galarraga was .318-31-85. Kevin Mitchell was .326-30-77. Mike Piazza was .319-24-92. In the American league Ken Griffey Jr. was .323-40-90. Frank Thomas was .353-38-101. Albert Belle was .357-36-101. Jose Canseco was .282-31.90. Joe Carter was .271-27-103. Kirby Puckett was .317-20-112. And then it ended- for the moment. The season was prematurely ended by another baseball strike. Commissioner Fay Vincent had accused the owners of stealing $280 million from the players using their collusion tactics of the previous decade. He singled out Bud Selig of the Milwaukee Brewers and Jerry Reinsdorf of the Chicago White Sox. Vincent was fired by the owners in 1992 and replaced by Selig, the first owner/commissioner. It was essentially a palace coup. Reinsdorf was said to be the driving force behind the strike, convincing the other owners that they could break the union. The owner’s demands were for, among other things, elimination of salary arbitration restrictions on free agency and a salary cap. The union couldn’t agree to those changes and Reinsdorf knew it. Reinsdorf had convinced the other owners that they could break the union if they held out. The strike canceled the rest of the season and even the post-season. It was the first time in 100 years there had been no World Series, since John McGraw had refused to play in what would have been the second series. We’d even had World Series through the World Wars. The strike was finally ended when US district Court Judge Sonia Sotomayor, (who is now on the Supreme Court), issued an injunction binding the owners and the players to adhere to the terms of existing collective bargaining agreement until a new one could be worked out. Reinsdorf still had the owners refusing to sign free agents until one of them broke ranks. It was Reinsdorf, who signed Albert Belle. The strike was over. People- and sportswriters- expressed frustration that such a great season as 1994 had been destroyed by more labor troubles. But you’d have to be blind not to see the connection. If all the players had played 162 games and had hit home runs at the rate they had been in 1994 for the entire 162 games, eight players would have hit 50+ home runs in one season. Jeff Bagwell would have broken Hack Wilson’s 64 year old National league home run record with 57. But he would have finished second to Matt Williams who would have broken Roger Maris’s record with 62. Junior Griffey would have led the American league with 58 home runs. Albert Belle would have hit 55. Barry Bonds and Frank Thomas would have hit 54 each. Kevin Mitchell would have hit 51 homers and Gary Sheffield 50. Fred McGriff and Andres Galarraga just missed with 49. If that season had ended with those results it would have been completely apparent that something had suddenly changed in a big way. In 1990, There were 3,317 home runs hit in major league baseball in 4,210 games. That’s 128 per 162 games. In 1991 it was 3,383 homers in 4,208 games = 130 per 162. In 1992 it was 3,038 homers in 4,212 games = 117 per 162 In 1993 it was 4,030 homers in 4,538 games = 144 per 162. Now, 1993 was an expansion year. Before we move on, let’s look at the same numbers for the other expansion years: In 1960 in the American League, (the year before they expanded), 143 homers were hit per 162 games. In 1961, the year of the expansion, that went up to 153. In 1962, the year after expansion it was 155. For the National League, in 1961-63, it was 157-145-127. That’s right, the home run rate actually declined in the expansion year. It further declined in 1963 because that was the year that Ford Frick ordered the mound raised and the strike zone enlarged. Both leagues expanded in 1969. Their combined home run averages in 1968-70: 99-130-103. Bowie Kuhn rescinded Frick’s changes for the 1969 season. The new ball parks reduced home runs with their regular dimensions. Home runs again declined after the expansion year. The National League expanded in 1977. Here are their averages from 1976-78: 93-136-106. Again the expansion year showed a sharp rise in home runs but the next year was a return to the norm for the time. So the impact of expansion on home run totals is less predictable than one might think but one could expect a decline in the following year. It didn’t happen: In 1994 it was 3,306 homers in 3,200 games = 167 per 162. And here is the rest of the decade: In 1995 it was 4,081 homers in 4,034 games = 164 per 162 In 1996 it was 4,962 homers in 4,534 games = 177 per 162 In 1997 it was 4,640 homers in 4,532 games = 166 per 162 In 1998 it was 5,064 homers in 4,864 games = 169 per 162 In 1999 it was 5,528 homers in 4,856 games = 184 per 162. In my last post in this series I showed the major league slugging averages over the years. Here are the all-time top 20 years in major league slugging percentage: 1) 1894 and 2000 .438 2) see above 3) 1930 and 1999 .435 4) see above 5) 2004 .428 6) 1996 and 2001 .427 7) see above 8) 1994 .425 9) 2003 and 2007 .423 10) see above 11) 1998 and 2006 .422 12) see above 13) 1997 .420 14) 2005 and 2009 .419 15) see above 16) 1995 .418 17) 1929, 2002, and 2008 .417 18) see above 19) see above 20) 1987 .415 1894 was the year the pitcher’s mound was moved back from 50 to 60 feet. It took the pitchers a while to recover. 1929-1930 came after the ball had been redesigned in the wake of Babe Ruth’s impact on the game. 1987, as discussed before, was a year when the ball was strongly suspected of being juiced. It came after a period of increasing offensive output following the 1981 strike. The other 16 years are 1994-2009. Clearly, there was a sea change in 1994 and the water level remained that high for 16 years. What produced this change? As usual there were many theories: - The weather in 1994. Nope. That doesn’t explain the next 16 years. - New ballparks. Yes, they favored hitters but the only new ball park that opened in 1994 was Coors Field, the biggest ballpark in the major leagues. This was in the National League and there was no interleague play yet. - Pitchers don’t pitch inside like they used to. I hear the same thing today from players who were playing then. It’s something all ballplayers say about the next generation. Even if true for the 1990’s, it wasn’t something that suddenly happened in 1994. - A variation on the last one was that pitchers face aluminum bats in the amateur ranks and are afraid to throw inside. Same problem: it has nothing to do with 1994. - Steroids. Again, why a sudden change in 1994? Surely steroids were not suddenly distributed to hundreds of major league players for the first time in 1994. Look at the players listed in the Mitchell Report as having used body or performance enhancing drugs: [URL="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Major_League_Baseball_players_named_in_the_Mitchell_Report"]List of Major League Baseball players named in the Mitchell Report - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/URL] I see some big names there: Barry Bonds, Jason Giambi, Gary Sheffield, Roger Clemens, Lenny Dykstra, Eric Gagne, David Justice, Andy petite, Mo Vaughn, Jose Canseco, Troy Glaus, Matt Williams and Wally Joyner. But there’s also Marvin Benard, Bobby Estella, Jeremy Giambi, Mark Carreon, Chris Donnels, Matt Franco, David Segui, Nook Logan and Rickey Bones, among many others who were never anything like big-time home run hitters. Obviously, you don’t get talent out of a needle. I think it’s obvious what happened here. Jerry Reinsdorf and the owners were going to try to make one last effort to break the union by forcing a strike. They knew this would be hugely unpopular and would cost the game many fans. To lessen the impact of the strike and get the fans back afterward, they ordered the laces tightened on the ball to unprecedented levels so there would be unprecedented levels of power-generated offense. It worked and because it worked, the owners kept the laces tight for years afterwards MLB finally came up with a “Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program” in 2006 to crack down on steroids but offensive production remained high until 2009 and even after that, it’s settled down to a level of about .400 for the major league slugging percentage, well above the pre 1994 numbers. The steroid issue has remained a good cover for the owner’s actions, transferring the ‘blame’ for the offensive explosion to the players. But it was the strike and the juiced ball that created the sea change. The on the field impact of the sea change is that baseball became very high scoring. Curt Gowdy used to say back in the 70’s, when he did the play-by-play for the game of the week that the average score of a major league baseball game was 4-2. When the average score is 4-2, 1-0 and 10-8 games are exceptional and create excitement as a pitcher’s duel or a slugfest. But if all the games seem to be 1-0 or 2-1, as they did in 1968, the pitcher’s duels are unexceptional and the slugfests too rare to have an impact. (See Soccer.) When the 10-8 games become the norm and the 1-0 games become too rare, the same thing happens. (See basketball.) The game is more interesting when it’s balanced between defense and offense. The seas change also produced a more one-dimensional game. Teams tried to win by hitting home runs and stopped doing the things that could produce scores in between those home runs. The stolen base became passe, along with the bunt and hit and run. Why run the bases aggressively and risk not being on them when the big pop comes? The balance between types of offense that characterized the “neutral period” of the 70’s and 80’s was gone, too. Off the field, allowing steroids to continue as the operative theory for the explosion causes players and even non-players to seek them out thinking that they will become more physically talented or impressive if they take them. Steroids are medications designed to accelerate tissue growth. In small, prescribed amounts, they can help people recover from injuries, (and by the way, there’s nothing wrong with that: I think players should be allowed to use them for that purpose in situations controlled by the league). But the people taking them were looking to create new and better versions of themselves, ignoring the highly problematic side-effects. And t people who supply them on the black market could care less of the side-effects on their clients. I think baseball owners need to admit that they forced the 1994 strike and that they juiced the ball to insure the continuing popularity of the game. Maybe then people would take another look at that Mitchell Report list and realize that steroids did not create the offensive explosion and that it won’t turn them into All-Stars or comic book super-heroes. [/QUOTE]

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