Coach D'Antoni breaks this play down nicely here. Unfortunately, this year's squad doesn't often have the personnel on the floor to run this set effectively. This play would either require Tyler Roberson to be on the bench with Lydon playing the 4, or Roberson would need to be at the 5 with Lydon at the 4. The former lineup only happens occasionally for short stretches. In the latter, Roberson has not proven to be an effective "roll" player, and he's an even less effective "pop" player. Consequently, teams don't have to commit much help to stop him. Watch how Charlotte surrounds the lane with help to take away Amare. Roberson doesn't command that attention. Sadly, he often rushes and doesn't execute when he gets scoring opportunities, partly because he lacks fundamental skills.
More to the point, though, D'Antoni identifies spacing as the key element here, but Syracuse's offense often lacks that. Once the team exhausts the initial option in the half-court offense (whether that be a pick-and-roll, a double-fist, power down screens, etc.), it just flows into a series of random pick-and-rolls, regardless of who the ball handler is and what the spacing off the ball looks like. Part of the problem is that the ball handlers don't allow proper spacing because they rush to use the ball-screen action instead of waiting for the play to develop.
One thing this video doesn't address is that the NBA three-point arc and wider lane naturally allow for better spacing. Defenders are taught to help with one foot in the lane. The wider lane allows more driving space for offensive players because those feet are further out to start. Furthermore, the three-point arc permits NBA teams that can spread the floor with shooters to make opponents pay for helping too much on drives or doubling in the post without needing much off-the-ball movement.
Charlotte's players actually take away Felton's drive in the video, but they leave three shooters open in doing so. Notice how deep Wilson Chandler's defender needs to be to help--his left foot is inside the college lane. The play design does what it should. Felton makes a poor read, despite D'Antoni's rationalizing the shot he takes. As the ball handler, he is the primary scoring option in the set, but his teammates--especially Chandler (there is no way his defender can get back out to him at the NBA three-point arc from that distance)--have better looks based on how Charlotte played the ball screen. Felton must make the proper decision. Instead, he plays right into what the defense wants. Unfortunately, Gbinije and Richardson often make the same mistake.
College defenses can commit to helping more easily because the narrow lane makes it simpler to have a foot in the paint and defend the rim, creating less driving space, while the closer arc makes it less demanding to recover to shooters. These aspects lessen the threat of the drive by the ball handler. A good defender can help his teammates stop dribble penetration and then close out to his own man if the ball is passed.
That's a key reason why sound college offenses include more off-the-ball movement than many NBA sets; such movement makes it more difficult for help defenders to plant themselves in the lane and recover to their own assignments to challenge shots. Regrettably, SU's players rarely screen off the ball unless it is part of the initial option, and they rarely cut to the basket to take advantage of defensive overplays. To be fair, they occasionally fade to the corners for three-point looks, but that is the extent of the off-the-ball action. Hence, the Orange(men) are easier to defend in the half court than they could be.
